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Abstract: This note proposes a new strategy to address the
challenges of reverse payment settlements in
pharmaceutical patent licensing. Many voices have long
been critical of suspicious reverse payment settlements, yet
little has been done by the courts to restrict these deals
under current antitrust law. However, shifting the fight to
the realm of patent law may be a better means of attack for
these challengers. Instead of scrutinizing the settlements
under doctrines of antitrust law, utilizing previously
developed patent law and policy could be a much more
fruitful endeavor. Specifically, reverse payment settlements
could be examined under an expanded version of the
doctrine of patent misuse. While patent misuse is similar to
antitrust analysis, the policy issues underlying patent
misuse make it more sympathetic to the view of restricting
suspicious reverse payment settlements. Following an in-
depth look into relevant patent policy, this note proposes
new procedural and slight substantive changes to the
doctrine of patent misuse, which would adapt the doctrine
to properly target suspicious reverse payment settlements.
Through this adaptation, the richly developed legal theory
of patent misuse can be applied to the circumstances of a
reverse payment settlement while maintaining its policy
goals.
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INTRODUCTION: REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT SUSPICIONS
Unsurprisingly, the United States' patent law and antitrust law
regimes often come into severe conflict with one another, as one
creates legal monopolies while the other seeks to outlaw them. One
circumstance creating such conflict is reverse payment settlements for
pharmaceutical patent licensing.' In a reverse payment settlement, a
patent infringement plaintiff, usually a name-brand drug company,
pays the patent infringement defendant, usually a generic drug
company, in return for the defendant's agreement to not make, use, or
sell the allegedly-infringing generic drug for some period of time.2 The
nature of the settlements is unusual, since the payment goes from
patent infringement plaintiff to infringement defendant.3 These
reverse payments, while uncommon in most circumstances, are a
natural by-product of the United States' generic pharmaceutical
introduction scheme under the Hatch-Waxman Act.4
I Reverse payment settlements are sometimes also referred to as exclusion payments. See
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1729 n.130 (2003) ("Exclusionary
payment refers to "'situations in which the [infringement] defendant, often a generic
pharmaceutical company, never has an opportunity to enter the market, and is paid not to
enter, as well as situations in which the defendant is paid to exit a market in which it
already competes"). See, e.g., in re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 189
(2d Cir. 2006). "Name-brand" and "pioneer" will be used interchangeably throughout this
note to describe drug companies who hold the original patent for the "first drug that
contains a particular active ingredient that is approved by the FDA for a specified use," as
compared to generic drug makers who make drugs "containing the active ingredient of but
not necessarily the same excipient substances ... as the pioneer drug marketed under a
brand name." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (8th ed. 2004).
2 Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the Presumptive Illegality Approach to Settlements of Patent
Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley,
87 MINN. L. REv. 1789, 1797 (2003).
3Id.
4See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (20o6)
(informally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act). The Hatch-Waxman Act is the statutory
scheme which sets the modern guidelines for introduction of generic pharmaceuticals to
the United States market. The Hatch-Waxman Act provisions create an environment where
reverse payment settlements are particularly attractive. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206
("reverse payments are particularly to be expected in the drug-patent context because the
Hatch-Waxman Act created an environment that encourages them"); accord in re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 252 (2003) [hereinafter
Cipro III ("reverse payments are a natural bi-product of the Hatch-Waxman process"); see
also Hovenkamp et al supra note 1, at 1757 ("[e]xclusion payments were not common in
patent infringement litigation prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman amendments").
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For example, in a recent case, Cephalon, Inc., a name-brand
pharmaceutical company, settled a patent infringement case by
collectively paying four generic drug makers $200 million per year to
keep their generic version of Provigil off the market until 2012.5 The
CEO of Cephalon was quoted: "We were able to get six more years of
patent protection. That's $4 billion in sales that no one expected." 6
Since the introduction of a generic drug drastically lowers the selling
price of that drug, the deal made economic sense for both parties. The
generics likely profited more from the settlement than they could in
sales of the generic drug on the market.7 Additionally, the name-brand
drug maker can maintain its high prices for the drug.8 With both
pioneer and generic drug companies profiting on the deal, the general
public is left with costly drug prices.9 Ironically, these settlements
which keep generic drugs off the shelves are largely due to the very
legislation that encourages generics to enter the market.
Under the framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a pioneer drug
maker often contests that a generic drug maker is infringing on its
pharmaceutical patent and proceeds with infringement litigation.1°
However, in pursuing litigation, weak patents are placed in major
jeopardy of being invalidated or ruled as having a narrow scope.,, To
5Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, "Pay for Delay" Settlements in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect
Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution),
Remarks at the Center for American Progress 5 (Jun. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/o9o623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
6id.
7 See Joe Mullin, Reversal of Fortune? Pharmaceutical Industries' Reverse-Payment
Settlements, IP LAW & Bus., Oct. 2009. The Mullin article is an excellent introductory
source of information regarding reverse payment settlements for observers who are
unfamiliar with the state of the controversy.
8id.
9 Id.
1' 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generics are offered an incentive
to assert that pioneer patent is not infringed or invalid. This is usually followed by the
pioneer filing an infringement suit. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 710 (Aspen
Publishers 20o8).
11 However weak a patent, it is still presumed valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (20o6). A patent is
only invalidated under an invalidity defense established by clear and convincing evidence.
See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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remedy this realistic injury to the pioneer drug maker, instead of
seeing through the litigation, a settlement may be agreed upon
between the pioneer drug maker and the potential generic drug
maker.12 In agreeing to the payment, the validity of the patent is not
jeopardized, as would be the case had the patent's validity been tried
in court through patent litigation. 13 However, particularly when
reverse payments are very large, there is suspicion that the patent
would have been invalidated or found not to be infringed if litigated to
its end.14
Reverse payment settlements have recently come under intense
antitrust scrutiny. Challengers to the settlements claim that they
prevent competition in the market and wrongfully extend the rights of
patent holders, making the settlements unlawful.'5 However, courts
have upheld almost all reverse payment settlements as legal under the
antitrust laws. 6 Critics are especially suspicious of settlements where
the infringement defendant is paid in excess of the value they could
have realized had they continued through litigation and invalidated
the patent. 7 Standards have been proposed where a settlement would
12 See Mullin, supra note 7.
13 Id.
14 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1758-59 (Large exclusionary payments suggest
inherent uncertainty as to the validity or scope of the patent).
15 See id.; see 15 U.S.C. § i (prohibiting restraint on trade); see United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("horizontal" restraints on trade amongst competitors
are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
16 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206 ("Heeding the advice of several courts and
commentators, we decline to conclude (and repeat that the plaintiffs do not ask us to
conclude) that reverse payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act such that an
allegation of an agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an antitrust
violation. We do not think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its patent
monopoly, without more, establishes a Sherman Act violation."); see, e.g., Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Phar., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003); but see in re Cardizem
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 911 (6th Cir. 2003) ("calling a forty-million-dollar reverse
payment to a generic manufacturer "a naked, horizontal restraint of trade that is per
se illegal because it is presumed to have the effect of reducing competition in the market
for Cardizem CD and its generic equivalents to the detriment of consumers").
'7 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 ("The less sound the patent or the less clear the
infringement, and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder,
the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to
retain the patent."); see in re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d
514, 534 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Cipro III] ("the greater the chance a court would
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be presumptively illegal if the patent is likely invalid or not being
infringed, or the settlement payment is unusually large (likely
signifying that the patent is invalid or not being infringed).18
An approach advocating presumptive illegality of suspicious
settlements is supported by patent policy in favor of weeding-out weak
and potentially invalid patents. Sound patent policy should stand for
only enforcing patent rights which are deserved. Weak patents,
undeserving of monopoly power, can be discovered through
identifying suspicious reverse payment settlements. 19 Additionally,
while patents are presumed valid,2° the courts have gone to
substantial ends to enable weak or "bad" 21 patents to be invalidated or
deemed them unenforceable for having too narrow of claim scope. 22 In
a legal landscape where patent rights are often viewed as at-odds with
antitrust law, the two legal regimes can find common ground in
refusing to afford weak patents undeserved monopoly power.
This note proposes to explore reverse payment settlements in
pharmaceutical drug markets in view of the existing and developing
patent law regime in the United States. Pulling together concepts from
across patent law and upon applying them to the framework of
antitrust related reverse payment settlements, we will shed new
insight on the topic. Through a patent framework, a new approach can
be applied to limit undeserved monopolistic drug pricing caused by
suspicious reverse payment settlements. Specifically, this note
proposes that the doctrine of patent misuse could logically be
broadened to be used as a mode of attack on suspicious reverse
payment settlements.
Part I provides a detailed look into the phenomenon of reverse
payment settlements, including an in-depth review of the Hatch-
hold the patent invalid, the higher the likelihood that the patentee will seek to salvage a
patent by settling with an exclusion payment").
18 See infra, Part II.A.
'9 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1757-58 (Large exclusionary payments suggest
inherent uncertainty as to the validity or scope of the patent).
20 Patents are presumed valid under the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
21 The term "bad patent," for our purposes, will be defined by any patent that would be
invalidated, ruled unenforceable, or non-infringed if litigated. For a discussion on bad
patents, see generally Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber
Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181 (2008).
22 See infra, Part III.
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Waxman Act. Special emphasis will be placed on the evolving story of
the conflict between patent and antitrust policy. Further, Part I
discusses how the courts have dealt with the antitrust legality of
reverse payment settlements.
Part II examines several proposed solutions to the problem of
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements. Antitrust commentators
are extremely concerned with the proposition of weak patents being
afforded monopoly rights, and are in support of steps which would
effectively weed out bad patents that are at the center of some of the
reverse payment settlements. Central to the critics' proposed solutions
is the examination of patents for their scope and validity. Part II also
explains that courts share these same concerns.
Part III examines reverse payment settlements through a patent
policy lens. Specifically, this section will focus on how patent policy is
in favor of scrutinizing suspicious reverse payment settlements. The
patent policy discussion will center on the contrasting policy levers of
exposing weak patents as opposed to the desire for certainty and the
presumption of validity in granted patents. Explanations of patent law
and policy will lead to the conclusion that an analysis of suspicious
reverse payments under a patent policy framework leads to a
particularly critical view of suspicious reverse payment settlements.
Part IV proposes a process by which reverse payment settlements
could be scrutinized through a patent policy doctrine rather than
through an antitrust analysis. Specifically, the doctrine of patent
misuse will serve as a foundation for a test in which the reverse
payment settlements are analyzed according to patent laws. The
patent policies discussed in Part III aid in allowing patent misuse to
target reverse payment settlements. Furthermore, a specific procedure
is proposed in which an expanded patent misuse doctrine is used to
examine and potentially attack suspicious reverse payment
settlements.
I. BACKGROUND ON REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
A. WHAT MAKES A REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT CONTROVERSIAL?
In a normal patent licensing settlement, a licensee, based on the
consideration of the use of the licensor's patent rights, enters into an
agreement where the licensee pays the licensor. These settlements
take place routinely and lay at the backbone of the largely successful
exclusive rights doctrine of patent protection.23 Additionally,
23 See NARD, supra note 10, at 629.
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traditional licensing leaves the option for a licensee to seek the
invalidation of the patent through litigation, thus weeding out bad
patents.24
Now consider an agreement in which a patent owner pays a
potential licensee a large sum of money so that the potential licensee
does not enter the market and does not threaten the validity of the
patent through litigation. This is the case in a reverse payment
settlement.25 These settlements most commonly take place in the
context of pharmaceutical patents, specifically when generic drug
makers attempt to enter the market. Tremendously popular and
profitable drugs such as Nolvadex,26 K-Dur 20,27 Hytrin,28 and Cipro29
have all been subject to reverse payment settlements. The existence of
these peculiar settlements arises from the unique statutory structure
for generic drug market entrance, under the Hatch-Waxman Act.30
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, it is often beneficial for the generic
drug company to claim that the pioneer drug maker's patent is invalid
or not infringed.31 Litigation for patent infringement ensues, though is
commonly resolved through settlement.
Courts generally favor settlements in patent infringement disputes
over extended and costly litigation.32 However, the reverse payments
are often for more money that a generic drug could ever make on the
market.33 Also, often the patents which the settlements surround
24 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (rejection of the doctrine of licensee
estoppel).
25 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1.
26 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 193 ("In 2001, Zeneca's domestic sales of tamoxifen
amounted to $442 million").
27 See Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (1ith Cir. 2005) ("K-Dur 20
itself was the most frequently prescribed potassium supplement").
28 See Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1296.
29 See Cipro II, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
30 See Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 4.
3' See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
32 See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075 ("There is no question that settlements provide a
number of private and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects of
litigation").
33 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1.
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could likely be invalidated or are not infringed.34 This situation, in
which a settlement is made between competitors not to compete, gives
rise to the obvious question of an antitrust violation.35 Furthermore,
because the patent infringement litigation is settled, there is no
opportunity for bad patents to be invalidated.
While some in the industry have applauded the acceptance of
reverse payment settlements by the courts,36 academics have long
criticized these settlements as a violation of the antitrust laws.37
Commentators suggest that reverse payment settlements fall outside
of antitrust legality because of their anticompetitive effects, as they
may extend a patent owner's rights beyond those afforded by the
issuance of the patent.38  Additionally, suspicions often arise
concerning the validity of the patents which are at the center of the
reverse payment settlements, especially when the payment is large.39
However, courts in all but a few particular cases have upheld the
settlements as pro-competitive and legal.4o
As United States medical reform has become a hotly-debated
issue, reverse payment settlements are now seen as an obstacle to
maintaining a long-term, cost-effective health care system in the
34 See infra, Part II.
35 See Mullin, supra note 7.
36 Id. ("One reason that courts approve of the agreements, their defenders say, is that they
allow both parties to balance the different risks they bring to the negotiating table ... If
reverse payments get reined in... the result could mean more cases going to trial rather
than settling. That would mean less predictable litigation costs, which would lead to fewer
ANDA filings, and fewer generic drugs, leaving consumers the ultimate losers.").
37 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1749-50.
38 See NARD, supra note 10, at 711 ("Challengers of exclusion payments have argued that all
settlements with exclusion payment should create a presumption that the patent holder
exceeded the scope of its patent").
39 Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 534 ("the greater the chance a court would hold the patent
invalid, the higher the likelihood that the patentee will seek to salvage a patent by settling
with an exclusion payment").
4o Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206 ("Heeding the advice of several courts and commentators,
we decline to conclude (and repeat that the plaintiffs do not ask us to conclude) that
reverse payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act such that an allegation of an
agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an antitrust violation. We do not
think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its patent monopoly, without
more, establishes a Sherman Act violation.").
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United States.41 Accordingly, the Obama Administration has taken
steps towards pushing reverse payment settlements towards
illegality.42 The Department of Justice (DOJ) has recently, and for the
first time, taken a negative view towards reverse payment settlements,
calling for their presumed illegality.43 The DOJ now joins the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in criticizing the legality of reverse payment
settlements44
Current FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz has taken a particularly
strong position against reverse payment settlements, calling them
"sweetheart deals" for pioneer drug companies.45 The FTC continues
to use considerable resources to fight the settlements in court,46 and
hopes that due to the recent political shift within the executive branch
in Washington and unison in policies amongst the DOJ and FTC,47 a
resolution to reverse payment settlements can be attained. However,
despite all the criticisms of courts' adoption of a policy of
permissibility of reverse payment settlements, it persists today. Courts
have continually struck down the government's attacks on the
settlements, which are based solely on United States antitrust law.48
41 The price of prescription drugs is very determinative to the total medical costs of the
United States. See Mullin, supra note 7 (according to FTC "delayed entry of generic drugs
into the market adds about $3.5 billion to U.S. consumers' health care tab per year.").
42 Brent Kendall, DOJShifts Policy on Generic Drug Patent Settlements, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, July 6, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124691728092502381.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2011).
43 Id. ("The department's antitrust division said in a court filing that drug patent
settlements should be presumed unlawful when branded drug makers pay their generic
counterparts to abandon patent challenges that could lead to early market entry of
competing generic medicines.") ("[t]he Justice Department under the Bush administration
did not embrace the FTC's viewpoint that the deals violated antitrust laws").
44 See Mullin, supra note 7.
45 See id. ("Leibowitz sees [reverse payment settlements] as straightforward violations of
antitrust law: companies colluding to monopolize, control, and divide up markets.").
46 Id. ("[tihe FTC's 30-lawyer health care division stills spends more time investigating and
litigating what the agency has dubbed "pay-for-delay" deals than on any other issue.").
47 See id. ("This has been percolating for a number of years without movement. The
political atmosphere is ripe for something to happen.").
41 See cases cited supra note 16.
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B. STRUCTURE OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
The Hatch-Waxman Act, formally the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act, governs the introduction of generic
pharmaceuticals into the domestic marketplace.49 Its original goals
were to facilitate a balance between pioneer and generic drugs, and to
promote generic drugs' quick entrance into the market by ensuring
prompt resolution of patent infringement disputes between pioneers
and generic entrants. 50
Under the scheme, a pioneer drug company files a New Drug
Application (NDA) for all pioneer drugs they hope to have approved
by the FDA.51 Along with filing the NDA, the name-brand drug
company must list in the Orange Book52 all patents which may be
interfered with by a generic company in an attempt to create a
bioequivalent3 drug. In return for listing patents which may be
infringed by a generic drug maker, the pioneer drug company has the
potential to secure a thirty-month delay of FDA approval for a generic
drug.54
A generic company who wishes to produce the drug can file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA.55 One
advantage of filing an ANDA is that it involves a much less rigorous
49 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (20o6).
For a discussion of the architecture of the Hatch-Waxman Act, see generally NARD, supra
note 10, at 709-10.
so Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1 at 1752; see 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5); Schering-Plough, 402
F.3d at 1059 n.2 ("The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was threefold: (1) to reduce the
average price paid by consumers; (2) preserve the technologies pioneered by the name-
brand pharmaceutical companies; and (3) create an abbreviated new drug application
("ANDA") to bring generic drugs to the market.").
51 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b).
52 Id. § 355(b)(1)(F). The "Orange Book" is the informal name for the book "Approved Drug
Products and Therapeutics Equivalents," which is published by the FDA, available at
www.fda.gov/cder/ob.
53 A bioequivalent drug is a drug which is similar to but not identical to another drug in
various chemical properties. See § 355(j)(8)(B)-(C). A generic drug must be a
bioequivalent of a pioneer drug to be eligible for an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). § 355(j)(2)(iv).
,4 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iii).
s5 See id. § 3550).
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application and approval process.56 Generics filing an ANDA do not
need to undergo clinical trials as would an NDA applicant.57 These
trials are especially lengthy and costly to a drug company.58 Instead,
the generic drug company only needs to prove bio-equivalence
between the generic drug and the pioneer drug.59
The ANDA application can be filed pursuant to several options
within the Hatch-Waxman Act if a patent is listed in the Orange Book
for the specific pioneer drug. One such option, and usually the most
attractive to the generic drug maker, is to file a Paragraph IV
certification which alleges that the pioneer's patent is invalid or not
infringed. 6° This has become an especially attractive option for generic
drug makers because it grants a 18o day exclusivity period to the first
generic drug company to file under Paragraph IV. This exclusivity
period bars other generic drug companies the right to market their
generic versions of the drug for 18o days after the first generic drug is
commercialized, or until the brand name drug patent is invalidated or
held not infringed. 61 This provision is intended to give the first generic
to challenge a patent's validity a special reward in return.
Once a Paragraph IV ANDA has been launched, the generic
company must inform the brand name drug company with formal
notice of its filing. Within twenty days, the generic drug maker must
inform the name-brand maker of the specific patent in question and
whether that patent is not infringed or is invalid.62
If the pioneer files a patent infringement suit within forty-five days
of receiving notice, it can enact the thirty-month stay provision. 63 If no
suit is filed, the ANDA is approved immediately. 64 Usually a suit is
56 See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1059 n.2.
57 Id.
98 Three clinical phases of drug testing are required for new drug approval. NARD, supra
note 10, at 709.
59 See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1059 n.2.
60 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
6, See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
62 See id. § 355(J)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
63 See id. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iii).
64 See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). However, the brand name maker can still sue for damages
for infringement at a later date. See NARD, supra note 10, at 710.
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filed, and the case goes to a federal district court to determine if the
patent is infringed or invalid.
If the generic drug maker prevails in court, its ANDA is approved.
If the pioneer company prevails, the ANDA is not approved and an
injunction is placed on the generic maker, barring them from entering
the market prior to the expiration of the pioneer's patent.65 However,
it is important to note that when litigation is completed to judgment,
the patent is exposed to a potential finding of invalidity. 66
Settlement often seems attractive to both parties. A ruling of
invalidity can be devastating for a name-brand drug company. Many
drug patents have an extremely high value, and can secure a multi-
million dollar revenue for the life of the patent.67 Additionally, a
generic that proceeds through litigation will be rewarded with no
more than 18o days of being the only generic on the market and will
sometimes not be able to enter the market for thirty months past the
commencement of the litigation. 68 Thus, under the Hatch-Waxman
framework, it is often economically advantageous for both of the
parties to settle. This is especially true when the pioneer drug
company is willing to offer more in settlement than the generic could
profit by entering the market. Following settlement, the patent is no
longer in jeopardy of invalidation, and the pioneer drug maker can
maintain a monopoly in the market. The special circumstances laid
out in the Hatch-Waxman Act create the perfect conditions for these
creative settlements to take place.
C. PATENT AND ANTITRUST AT ODDS
There is often turbulence in the relationship between antitrust and
patent law. While antitrust law seeks to promote competition by
explicitly illegalizing monopolies, 69 patent law establishes a regime of
legal monopolies.7O Patent law in the United States springs from an
65 This resolution of the litigation verifies the validity or invalidates the patent and
determines the scope of the patent.
66 Some reverse payment settlements are made with specific arrangements which provide a
vacatur of a ruling of invalidity at a low court. See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 19o.
67 Id.
68 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iv); see id. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iii).
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
70 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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enumerated power of Congress to "promote the Progress of [ ...] useful
Arts."71 This common constitutional thread passes through all laws
relating to patents, and is the starting point to the analysis of the
validity of any patent law.72 The goal of patent policy is to stimulate
innovation and ultimately to stimulate competition. Patent law grants
an innovator "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States" for a limited term of
years. 73 On the other hand, antitrust law has the ultimate goal of
stimulating competition and innovation by prohibiting "[e]very
contract, combination [...] or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States,"74 and "monopoliz[ation],"75
under the Sherman Act. Courts have held that only unreasonable
restraints on trade are in violation of Section One of the Sherman
Act.76 Violations of Section Two monopolization charges have been
held by the courts to require both a monopolization of the market as
well as the willful maintenance of that monopoly by the monopolizer.77
Courts often discuss the dichotomy of patent and antitrust law,
and must resolve problems arising at the intersection of the two
7' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72 See e.g. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 4 (1966).
7335 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 201-02.
74 15 U.S.C. § 1.
7515 U.S.C. § 2.
76 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202 n.13 ("'Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits
every agreement 'in restraint of trade,' th[e Supreme] Court has long recognized that
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.' Conduct may be deemed an
unreasonable restraint of trade in two ways. Conduct may be considered per se
unreasonable because it has 'such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and
such limited potential for procompetitive benefit.' In most cases, however, conduct will be
evaluated under a 'rule of reason' analysis, *according to which the finder of fact must
decide whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition,
taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant
business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
history, nature, and effect."') (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
77United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of monopoly
under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.").
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regimes.78 Reverse payment settlements are at the center of this
intersection.79 However, courts and commentators have largely
analyzed the antitrust implications of reverse payment settlements
through an antitrust law lens. Somewhat missing from the analysis is
how patent law and policy arguments may be in agreement with
antitrust arguments. Both regimes seek to ultimately stimulate the
economy. Therefore, a desirable solution to the treatment of reverse
payment settlements is to find some common ground at the
crossroads of patent and antitrust law. This idea will be developed
later in this note.
D. CURRENT LEGAL TREATMENT
Generally, courts have found that most reverse payment
settlements are not in conflict with the antitrust laws of the Sherman
Act.8° Courts in all but one case have rejected a per se illegal standard
for reverse payment settlements. 81 The standard which has been
accepted by a number of circuit courts states that "unless the
'exclusionary effects of the agreement' exceed the 'scope of the
patent's protection"' there is no antitrust violation. 82 Some courts have
78 See Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1o67 ("Although the exclusionary power of a patent
may seem incongruous with the goals of antitrust law, a delicate balance must be drawn
between the two regulatory schemes.").
79 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 201-02 ("It is the tension between restraints on anti-
competitive behavior imposed by the Sherman Act and grants of patent monopolies under
the patent laws, as complicated by the Hatch-Waxman Act, that underlies this appeal.");
see United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963) ("[T]he possession of a
valid patent.., does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions of the
Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly.").
80 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 2o6 ("Heeding the advice of several courts and commentators,
we decline to conclude (and repeat that the plaintiffs do not ask us to conclude) that
reverse payments are per se violations of the Sherman Act such that an allegation of an
agreement to make reverse payments suffices to assert an antitrust violation. We do not
think that the fact that the patent holder is paying to protect its patent monopoly, without
more, establishes a Sherman Act violation.").
811d.
82 Id. at 212 (quoting Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 538); accord Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d
at 1076. However, the majority in Tamoxifen explicitly states in a footnote that "A plaintiff
need not allege or prove sham litigation in order to succeed in establishing that a
settlement has provided defendants *with benefits exceeding the scope of the tamoxifen
patent.' Whether there is fraud or baseless litigation may be relevant to the inquiry, but it is
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gone on to require a showing that the patent was "procured by fraud"
or "shown to be objectively baseless" in order to prove an antitrust
injury.83 Objectively baseless is defined as "no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits."84 The objectively
baseless standard is a standard similar to that found in sham litigation
cases .85
Cardizem was the exception noted above, where the agreement
was found per se illegal.86 However, courts have distinguished the
findings of Cardizem because it involved a settlement which
stipulated that related drugs not be developed by the generic drug
maker, regardless of their relationship to the pioneer drug's patent. 87
Thus, in Cardizem, the patent rights were extended through the
settlement, making it per se illegal.88
While the Supreme Court has had opportunities to deal with
reverse payment settlements, they remain silent on the issue.89 Thus,
hardly, we think, 'the... standard,' post at 227, as the dissent posits in order to take issue
with it. Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213 n.27.
83id. at 213 ("Unless and until the patent is shown to have been procured by fraud, or a suit
for its enforcement is shown to be objectively baseless, there is no injury to the market
cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as competition is restrained only within the
scope of the patent.") (quoting Cipro 111, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 535); accord Asahi Glass Co.,
Ltd. v. Pentech Phar., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2003); but see Tamoxifen,
466 F.3d at 213 n.27 (stating that contrary to the dissent's beliefs, there is not a pleading
standard involving a "sham" requirement).
84 Tamoxifen, 466 3d at 213.
85 See Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 6o
(1993) ("We now outline a two-part definition of "sham" litigation. First, the lawsuit must
be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits.").
86 Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 911 ("calling a forty-million-dollar reverse payment to a generic
manufacturer "a naked, horizontal restraint of trade that is per se illegal because it is
presumed to have the effect of reducing competition in the market for Cardizem CD and its
generic equivalents to the detriment of consumers").
87 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 213-14 ("It is thus unlike the agreement the Sixth Circuit held per
se illegal in Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908, which included not only a substantial reverse
payment but also an agreement that the generic manufacturer would not market non-
infringing products") (discussing Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896).
88 See id.
89 Circuit Courts have largely agreed and there does not appear to be a circuit split at this
point. See Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896, cert. denied sub non; Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Kroger
Co., 543 U.S. 939 (2004); see Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d 1294, cert. denied sub non;.
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if further delay is undesirable, Congressional action may be a proper
response. The Court may grant certiorari in the near future, however,
considering the newfound importance being placed on the issue by the
Obama Administration, as well as the recent agreement amongst the
DOJ and the FrC on the issue of reverse payment settlements.9O In
summary, the courts have been tremendously pro-reverse payment
settlements when they have had an opportunity to find judgment.
II. THE CRITICAL PROBLEM SURROUNDING BAD PATENTS IN REVERSE
PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
A. IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Commentators have voiced various opinions on how to deal with
an antitrust suit concerning a reverse payment settlement.91 However,
one common thread runs through all of the arguments: the strength of
a patent is of major concern when it is associated with an agreement
that may be anticompetitive.92 Many of the brightest minds in
antitrust law have confronted the issue of weak patents being given
more rights than they should be afforded when a reverse payment
settlement is entered into.
Intuitively, weak patents are more likely to be the subject of
reverse payment settlements. Conversely, a strong patent, or a patent
which is very likely being infringed upon by a generic drug maker, is
less likely to be subject to a reverse payment settlement. Herbert
Hovenkamp, in his treatise, states the situation most clearly:
[I]f the patent is very likely worthless or not infringed,
then the patentee stands to lose much by litigating to a
judicial decision. In that case it will pay any amount up
to the expected value of the monopoly that will be lost
from the new entry. ... Many of the pharmaceutical
settlement agreements that have provoked antitrust
Walgreen Co. v. Abbott Labs., 543 U.S. 939 (2004); see FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548
U.S. 919 (2006).
90 See Mullin, supra note 35.
91 See generally Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1; Cotter, supra note 2; Daniel A. Crane,
Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REv. 698, 709 (2004).
92 See infra Part II.B.
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litigation have involved large payments from patentees
to challengers. Payments of this magnitude indicate
that the parties harbored significant doubt that the
patents in question were valid or infringed, which
entails a significant possibility that, if pursued to a
judicial outcome, generic competition would have
entered the market.93
Both the courts and commentators acknowledge the fact that
reverse payment settlements present situations in which a potentially
invalid patent is shielded from being invalidated by pre-judgment
settlement. This allows for otherwise valueless patents to maintain
immense value. The following sections consider how commentators
support a policy where bad patents would increasingly be exposed for
what they are. While courts resist antitrust illegality, they consistently
are troubled by the prospect of bad patents escaping invalidity
through settlement. Of special concern is weeding out bad patents.
B. CRITICS' CONCERNS WITH THE VALIDITY OF PATENTS IN REVERSE
PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Many commentators have attempted to address how a reverse
payment settlement should be examined in an antitrust analysis.
Among the most notable and most widely cited is the theory set forth
by Hovekamp, Janis, and Lemly (hereafter the "Hovenkamp
analysis").94 This theory proposes that some reverse payment
settlements surrounding a Hatch-Waxman Act generic infringement
dispute should be presumed illegal.95
Hovenkamp's analysis begins with examining whether the
presence of IP rights is relevant in an antitrust challenge to an IP
settlement.96 For instance, sometimes the settlement is clearly not
anticompetitive97 while in other circumstances, some settlements
93 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: VOLUME XII 332-33 (2d ed. 2005).
94 See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1.
95 Id. at 1759.
96 Id. at 1724.
97 Id.
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would be illegal even if the patent in dispute was fully enforceable.98
In these two circumstances, the IP rights in question need not be
considered. However, a middle group exists where the settlement
would likely be an antitrust violation if not for the IP monopoly
rights.99 In these cases, it may be necessary to examine, at least to
some degree, the strength of the patent rights that are at the center of
the licensing agreement. 100 In this middle class, Hovenkamp argues
that the case should be decided on IP grounds rather than a
traditional antitrust rule of reason approach.101
Examining the strength and scope of patent rights within an
antitrust trial can be overly burdensome and complex for the court. 0 2
Therefore, commentators like Hovenkamp have developed guidelines
for when the validity and scope of a patent should be probed more
thoroughly to properly evaluate the anticompetitive nature of the
licensing settlement.103 The commentators developed various
thresholds, largely dependent upon when a settlement appears to be
suspicious in light of economic effects which only make sense if a
patent will likely be invalidated in litigation.°4
For example, Hovenkamp supports a presumption of antitrust
illegality.1o5 This presumption may be rebutted by the patent holder
(antitrust defendant) if they show "both (1) that the ex ante likelihood
of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the
size of the payment is no more than the expected value of litigation
and collateral costs attending the lawsuit."1 6 Of the widely cited
theories, Hovenkamp's is the harshest on antitrust defendants, since it
98 Id.
99 Id.
oo Id. at 1724-25.
1l Id. at 1724. The rule of reason is a judicial doctrine holding that a trade practice violates
the Sherman Act only if the practice is an unreasonable restraint of trade, bases on the
totality of the circumstances. See Nat'l Soc. of Prof 1 Eng'rs. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 687-92
(1978).
102 See Cotter, supra note 2, at 1807-12
103 See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 1759.
104 See id.
105 Id.
o6d.
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places the burden of proof on the defendant and allows for the
settlement to be for no more than the cost of potential litigation and
collateral costs. 10 7
Cotter proposes a similar approach to Hovenkamp et al., with the
only major difference being the size of the agreement for determining
the threshold of presumptive illegality. 1°8 The burden of proof is still
placed on the antitrust defendants.o9 As compared with Hovenkamp
et al.'s threshold of litigation costs, Cotter advocates a more expansive
approach in evaluating settlement value.110 Cotter suggests that where
reverse payment settlements are "below the expected amount of the
patent defendant's loss if an injunction were to issue, the burden of
proving validity and infringement should be somewhat easier to
satisfy than at a full-blown infringement trial."111 However, he states
that when the reverse payment is higher than the expected damages,
danger of anticompetitive behavior becomes higher.112 Cotter
advocates a standard under which the patent infringement plaintiff
would have to prove either that the patent is valid and infringed, or
that the payment is "consistent with a high probability of success on
the merits, in light of the parties' expected gains and losses."'' 3
However, Cotter does acknowledge that stating specific "rules" for
various settlement amounts may be impossible."4
A third approach, proposed by Crane, supports a standard more
favorable to the antitrust defendants (the settling parties)."5 Unlike
Hovenkamp et al. and Cotter, the burden of proof is not shifted to the
107See id.
108 Cotter, supra note 2, at 1795-97, 1802.
log Id. at 1815.
no See id. at 1814.
l"Id
.
112 Id.
113 Id. supra note 2, at 1815.
114 See id. ("To state an applicable 'rule' with more precision, however, may be
impossible.").
1"5 Crane, supra note 91, at 709.
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antitrust defendants. 116 However, emphasis is still placed on the
likelihood that the patent is valid and infringed.117
While there is a spectrum of standards proposed for antitrust
evaluation, it is noteworthy that while the value of the settlement is
integral to each analysis, the likelihood of prevailing in the patent
infringement lawsuit is paramount under each of the proposed
standards. Each of the tests seek to identify and punish settlements
surrounding patents that do not deserve exclusionary rights because
they would be invalidated.
In review, each commentator weighs the threat to antitrust law
against the burden of making an antitrust defendant prove, to some
degree, the validity of his patent.118 Hovenkamp et al. are very
concerned with disallowing patents that do not have a "significant"
chance of prevailing when litigation is carried through.119 Cotter is
concerned with the validity of patents, especially in cases in which the
reverse payment is particularly large.120 Crane acknowledges that
there is "relatively little social cost" in mandating the settlers to take
steps to prove the validity of the patent to some degree.121 While the
standards vary considerably, a constant emphasis appears to be placed
on scrutinizing the strength of the patent to ensure that undeserved
exclusionary rights are not being exploited in violation of antitrust
laws.
C. COURTS' CONCERNS WITH THE VALIDITY OF THE PATENTS IN
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Courts are also deeply concerned with the potential for weak
patents to be protected through reverse payment settlements. While
the courts have continually found no antitrust violation in reverse
116d.
117 Id. Under Crane's analysis, a critical point to consider is whether "the ex ante likelihood
that the defendant would be excluded from the market if the case was finally adjudicated."
118 For a discussion on varying standards of analyzing patent validity and scope during an
antitrust trial, see Cotter, supra note 2, at 1807-12 (antitrust tribunal could conduct a
patent trial-within-a trial, a minimal inquiry, or a truncated inquiry).
119 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 1, at 1759.
120 Cotter, supra note 2, at 1814-15.
121 Crane, supra note 91, at 709; accord Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 227.
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payment settlements, they have acknowledged critics' concerns of the
"troubling dynamic that is at work in these cases. '"122 An important
concern is that reverse payments are more likely to occur when the
patent in question is weak and not being infringed upon or is
invalid.123
Courts shelter themselves from this reality by simplistically
announcing that even weak patents are afforded the allowance of a
settlement.124 The Second Circuit in Tamoxifen only reluctantly
conceded that abuse is likely occurring pertaining to bad patents
which would be held as invalid or non-infringed as a result of
litigation.125 The court stated that "[s]o long as the law encourages
settlement, weak patent cases will likely be settled even though such
settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies that are,
perhaps, undeserved. '"12 6 This submission to such an obvious and
pertinent factor should not be acceptable, especially when one
considers that a sizeable number of reverse payment settlements
occur surrounding patents in substantial jeopardy of being invalidated
as the result of litigation.127
In Valley Drug, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the problem of
parties possibly lacking good faith in the validity of their patents.128
The court concluded that the size of the settlement alone cannot
indicate whether the settlement was entered in bad faith, or whether
122 See supra note 17.
123 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 ("The less sound the patent or the less clear the
infringement, and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder,
the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to
retain the patent.").
124 See id. at 208 ("[O]nly if a patent settlement is a device for circumventing antitrust law
is it vulnerable to an antitrust suit. Suppose a seller obtains a patent that it knows is almost
certainly invalid (that is, almost certain not to survive a judicial challenge), sues its
competitors, and settles the suit by licensing them to use its patent in exchange for their
agreeing not to sell the patented product for less than the price specified in the license. In
such a case, the patent, the suit, and the settlement would be devices-masks-for fixing
prices, in violation of antitrust law.") (quoting Asahi Glass Co., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991).
125 Id. at 211.
126 Id. (settlement included a vacatur of holding of invalidity from the district court).
127 See id.
128 Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1300, 1309-10 (generic firm was paid roughly $75 million
to keep generic drug maker out of the market).
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the patent would be found invalid at the conclusion of litigation.129
However, the court did not directly confront the claim that some
showing of proof should be made that the patent is valid.13o
Courts also have defended against the inherent issue of weak or
invalid patents being afforded undeserved monopoly power following
a reverse payment settlement by observing that a settlement cannot
prevent other generic drug makers from filing ANDA's and
challenging the validity of the given patent.131 Courts quickly conclude
that a series of settlements would not be possible for a pioneer drug
manufacturer, due to the costs of each settlement.132 However, this
stance assumes both a receptive generic drug making market, which
will seize the opportunity for developing a generic drug from a weak
patent, as well as an economic climate in which numerous settlements
would quickly drive the profitability of the pioneer drug down to
nothing. Both of these assumptions are far from definite. 133 In fact, in
a recent reverse payment case, four separate generic drug makers
were involved in a reverse payment settlement.134
Dissenters in the court have proposed a test which would directly
address the problem of bad patents being used in reverse payment
settlements. 135 For example, Judge Pooler of the Second Circuit would
129 Id.
130 See id. at 1309-11.
131 See Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 534 ("But the answer to this concern lies in the fact
that, while the strategy of paying off a generic company to drop its patent challenge would
work to exclude that particular competitor from the market, it would have no effect on
other challengers of the patent, whose incentive to mount a challenge would also grow
commensurately with the chance that the patent would be held invalid."); accord
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (quoting Cipro III).
132 See Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211-12 ("There is, of course, the possibility that the
patent holder will continue to buy out potential competition such that a settlement with
one generic manufacturer protecting the patent holder's ill-gotten patent monopoly will be
followed by other settlements with other generic manufacturers should a second, third, and
fourth rise to challenge the patent. We doubt, however, that this scenario is realistic.").
133 For a discussion on the economics of a generic drug entering the market, see generally
Richard G. Frank, Generic Entry and the Price of Pharmaceuticals, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 75, 89 (1997).
134 Leibowitz, supra note 5, 5 (four generic drug makers were paid in a settlement).
135 See, e.g., Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 228 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("Thus, in assessing the
reasonability of a Hatch-Waxman settlement, I would rely primarily on the strength of the
patent as it appeared at the time at which the parties settled[.]").
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look primarily to the strength of the patent at the time of the
settlement.3 6 Only as secondary factors would a settlement's other
circumstances, such as payment amount and profit forecasting of the
generic drug, enter the antitrust rule of reason analysis.137 An
emphasis has clearly been placed on the potential invalidity of the
patent. Courts are aware of the problems of weak patents in reverse
payment settlements, but largely disregard the issue.
III. PATENT POLICY IN AGREEMENT WITH A STRICT STANDARD FOR
ILLEGALITY OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
While courts have not readily accepted the prospect of examining
the scope and validity of a patent at issue in a settlement under
antitrust analysis, most commentators agree that it is necessary in
some cases. This is because in some cases the antitrust analysis will
turn on the validity and scope of a patent and not on the traditional
rule of reason developed surrounding antitrust law. Furthermore, if
we accept at any level that in these circumstances patent law should
be central to the analysis, patent law and policy should be examined in
greater depth to reveal what they actually have to say in context of
reverse payment settlements.
Since it is now apparent that patent law should play a role in the
reverse payment analysis, further investigation is required concerning
the policy concerns revealed through a patent law inspection of the
settlements. In this section, I will explain that when the competing
interests within patent policy are weighed in the context of reverse
payment settlements, it is clear that a very strict approach should be
employed as to when a patent's validity and scope are analyzed within
an antitrust analysis. The threshold should be low, in agreement with
scholars such as Hovenkamp and Cotter, as opposed to the very high
threshold applied by most courts. Specifically, within the reverse
payment situation, two major patent policy levers become clearly at
odds: (1) the preference that invalid patents be exposed through
litigation and (2) the presumption of validity and certainty that comes
136 See id.
137 See id. ("I would rely... secondarily on (a) the amount the patent holder paid to keep
the generic manufacturer from marketing its product, (b) the amount the generic
manufacturer stood to earn during its period of exclusivity, and (c) any ancillary anti-
competitive effects of the agreement including the presence or absence of a provision
allowing the parties to manipulate the generic's exclusivity period.").
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with the issuance of a patent from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office.
A. INVALIDATING AND REDUCING THE SCOPE OF PATENTS FOR THE
PUBLIC GOOD
The first lever of patent policy I will examine is the desire for weak
or invalid patents to be identified as such, so they are exposed as
powerless to hold undeserved monopoly power. This task can be
carried out through infringement litigation or declaratory judgments
for invalidity. Courts and lawmakers have left substantial clues of their
favor for policies and practices which identify weak patents and weed
them out. Such clues can be found in the context of licensee estoppel,
the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the expansion of declaratory
judgments in patent law, as well as other patent policy reforms. These
clues form pieces of a puzzle that when fitted together show an ever-
growing sentiment that weak patents have no place in creating
pharmaceutical monopolies.
1. LICENSEE ESTOPPEL
The Supreme Court expanded the power to weed out bad patents
in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.138 Lear centers on the right of a licensee to
challenge the patent of the licensor for invalidity.'39 Prior case law
prohibited these challenges under the doctrine of licensee estoppel.140
However, the Supreme Court made a shift in policy and rejected the
longstanding doctrine.141
The Supreme Court reasoned that it was for the public good to
weed out patents as the Court quoted the landmark case Pope
Manufacturing., stating, "[i]t is as important to the public that
competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his
monopoly[.]"42 This language signals the Court's continuing
138 See Lear, supra note 24.
139 See generally id.
140d. at 656.
141Id. at 671.
142 Id. at 663-64 (quoting Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
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intolerance for bad patents being given protection from findings of
invalidity and non-infringement.
However, even if the mechanisms favoring a policy of weeding out
bad patents are in place, some party must actually initiate the
litigation that can end in patent invalidation or non-infringement.
There are few individuals or groups who have the means to challenge
and weed out a significant amount of bad patents. At the same time,
pharmaceutical consumers are the truly affected group following a
reverse payment settlement, because they can expect to see no drop in
the price of their pharmaceuticals. If generic pharmaceutical
companies cannot or will not sue due to the terms of a reverse
payment settlement, the existing mechanisms for findings of invalidity
in place are worthless.
Therefore, licensees (the generics) are the natural party
responsible for utilizing the invalidity mechanisms, thus ensuring that
the public is not harmed by bad patents. In the context of licensee
estoppel, the Supreme Court in Lear supported this reasoning in
stating "[1]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's
discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually be required
to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification."'143 Here, the Court appealed to the public interest when
considering that a potential infringer must be available to challenge a
patent's validity. 144 This is the same public interest that is at the heart
of the antitrust policy in the United States, i.e. consumer welfare. In
applying this policy, the Court found that contract law should
sometimes be preempted by the policy favoring the public's interest in
weeding out bad patents. 145
In the case of a reverse payment settlement, a contract also stands
in the way of testing a patent for invalidity. A limited number of
companies have the resources to represent the public in invalidating
bad pharmaceutical patents. Applying the noted policy to reverse
payment settlements would suggest that it is not favorable to allow the
settlement agreement's contract terms to outweigh the public interest
in at least examining the validity of the patent at issue. The reverse
143 Id. at 670.
144Id.
145 Id. at 670-71 ("We think it plain that the technical requirements of contract doctrine
must give way before the demands of the public interest in the typical situation involving
the negotiation of a license after a patent has issued.").
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payment is in effect "muzzling" the appropriate parties from
invalidating the patents. Therefore, patent policy suggests that the
reverse payment settlement scheme as a whole is unfavorable since
the limited number of public protectors (the generics) are disallowed
from pursuing the mechanisms of patent invalidation.
2. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Courts have also confronted similar policy issues in the context of
when a declaratory judgment may be issued on the validity or scope of
a patent. In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court
was confronted with the question of whether a patent licensee must
terminate or breach its license agreement before it can seek a
declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed.146 The party seeking the declaratory judgment for validity
argued that the licensee should not have to expose itself to liability
before seeking a declaratory judgment. 147 The case turned on whether
an "actual controversy" was present, as is required under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.148 The Court held that a required "actual
controversy" existed even when no breach of the licensing agreement
had taken place.149
Also included in the opinion was a direct criticism of the Federal
Circuit's standard for whether an "actual controversy" exists under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.i50 Reacting to MedImmune, the Federal
Circuit revised its standard for obtaining a declaratory judgment.5S
146 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120-21 (2007).
147 Id. at 122.
148Id. at 120-21; see 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006) ("In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction,... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.") (emphasis added).
149 Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 118.
150 Id. at 132 n.11.
151 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("In Medlmmune, the Supreme Court in a detailed footnote stated that our two-prong
reasonable apprehension of suit' test 'conflicts' and would 'contradict' several cases in
which the Supreme Court found that a declaratory judgment plaintiff had a justiciable
controversy.") (discussing MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118).
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The reasonable apprehension test1 52 was overruled and changed to a
standard of "whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances,
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality[.]"153 Thus,
the requirements for seeking a declaratory judgment were
substantially eased, allowing for the validity of more patents to be
tested by the court.
The new "actual controversy" standard was then applied in several
situations. In one case, the Federal Circuit held that a statement by a
patent owner that it would not sue its competitor did not eliminate the
justiciable controversy created by the patent holder in approaching
the competitor about a licensing agreement. 54 The Federal Circuit
also applied the standard in a generic/pioneer pharmaceutical patent
case,155 in which it held that a declaratory judgment was proper even
when a patent infringement suit was not imminent.5 6
In creating the new declaratory judgment standard for patent
infringement, the court indicated its favor for a patent policy that
seeks to weed out bad patents. In expanding declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, more bad patents can be targeted and exposed as invalid
or narrow in scope. And while MedImmune and subsequent Federal
Circuit cases lack much direct discussion about policy considerations
for weeding out patents, especially as compared with Lear, their
results are totally inconsistent with the findings of presumptive
legality of reverse payment settlements that shelter bad patents from
exposure.
152 See id. (The reasonable apprehension test is "a two-part test to determine if an 4actual
controversy' exists in a general declaratory judgment action for patent non-infringement or
invalidity. This test requires both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will
face an infringement suit and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such an activity.") (citation omitted).
153 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127.
154 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 48o F.3d 1372, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
155 See generally Teva Pharm., 482 F.3d 1330.
156 Id. at 1339-40.
2012]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
3. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Verification of the policy preference for exposing weak patents
through litigation comes directly from the most common applications
of the Hatch-Waxman Act. As stated previously in Part I.B., routinely
the best course of action for a generic pharmaceutical company
seeking an ANDA is to allege that the brand name drug patent is
either invalid or not infringed. 157 The incentive of exclusive
distribution of its drug for a time is provided to the first generic to test
the validity of a pioneer's patent. 158 This incentive is to promote
generics by testing the strength of the brand name's patent. The entire
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act rests on the realization that some
patents will be challenged. In building into the act procedures for
testing a patent's validity,59 the last thing the drafters of the Act
wanted was to build a scheme in which drug patents were not
challenged for their enforceability over bioequivalent generic drugs.
4. OTHER CLUES ABOUT PATENT POLICY
Recently, patent policy has shifted towards a stance that
acknowledges weak patents and seeks to limit their harm. 16o In In re
Seagate Technology, L.L.C., the Federal Circuit declared that willful
infringement requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the
infringer "acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent."' 61 This approach allows
potential infringers to read patents and decide whether they want to
challenge a patent's validity or design around the patent without
risking the increased damages associated with willful infringement.
Either way, weak patents are exposed.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C. held that lower courts' injunctions are a matter of equitable
discretion.162 This policy holding allows district courts to fittingly deal
'57 See sources cited supra note 10.
158 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).
159 See id. § 355(J)(2)(A)(vii)(I) (2oo6).
16o See Brief of Amicus Curiae of 22 Law and Bus. Professors in Support of Appellants at
26-27, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
161 In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 136o, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
162 EBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
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with bad patents by making an equitable decision as to injunctive
relief. Courts have continued to push towards better regulation of
weak patents.
B. CERTAINTY OF PATENT RIGHTS OUTWEIGHED
Underlying the entire dilemma of examining the scope of a patent
in the context of an antitrust analysis is the strong policy presumption
of the validity of a patent and the certainty of those claims made in the
patent. The Patent Act directly guarantees a presumption of validity to
any issued patent.163 However, several concerns arise when putting
weight in a patent's certainty and validity. These include the reality of
patent prosecution and the standard the court uses in infringement
hearings. I will also consider the limitations of good policy in the
insurance defense. This defense maintains that a license is much like
an insurance policy and specific payments have little to do with the
specifics of the patent's strength. While a patent's presumption of
validity cannot be ignored, it is not a more influential policy lever than
promoting the public good by weeding out weak pharmaceutical
patents in the reverse payment context.
1. REALITIES OF THE PATENT PROSECUTION PROCESS
When the USPTO issues a patent, the patented concept is put
through a reasonably rigorous test of its novelty, non-obviousness,
and utility. Indeed, the entire field of patent prosecution seeks to
create a system where patents are issued in a fair manner to the
appropriate limits mandated by law. However, this highly idealized
situation is often disputed. 164 Limited PTO resources mixed with
situations ripe for patent attorneys to abuse the system may be a more
accurate representation.165 While the penalties for attorney
misconduct are great, the system is far from perfect, with patents
routinely issued that cannot stand up in court.
163 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
164 Many commentators recognize that the PTO does not have the resources to thoroughly
investigate all applications. See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a
Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 181 (20o8) ("[T]he U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) is issuing far too many bad patents."); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001) (stating that USPTO does not spend
enough time examining each patent).
165 See supra note 164.
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2. THE STANDARD TO EVALUATE PATENT VALIDITY
The Patent Act guarantees presumptive validity to all issued
patents. 166 Courts have interpreted this to mean that the presumption
can only be overcome with "clear and convincing evidence" of
invalidity.167 However, commentators have suggested that the
standard is not as rigid as it may appear,168 and that it may shift to a
lesser standard in the near future.169 A lessening of this standard
would translate into a more limited presumption of validity.
Commentators are open to the examination of how strong the
presumption of validity should be. Some claim that a "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard for disproving the presumption is
too strict.170 Observers say that the there is nothing in the statutorily
mandated presumption of validity71 that is inherently connected to
the "clear and convincing" standard.172 It may make more sense to set
a standard that is more in touch with the current state of patent
166 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
167 E.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 136o (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(The Federal Circuit rejected a "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" and firmly
established the "clear and convincing evidentiary standard.").
168 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has treated the evidentiary standard of "clear and
convincing" with fluidity. See Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The
"Dubious Preponderance," 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 930 (2004) ("[I]t would be a
mistake to assume that, because the words of the standard have remained constant
throughout the Federal Circuit's tenure, the message of the presumption of validity has
likewise remained constant or that there is a tight connection between the words of the
standard and specific case outcomes.").
169 The policy will likely change within the lifetime of currently pending patent
applications. See Dennis Crouch, Challenging the Strong Presumption of Patent Validity
(Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/04/challengng-the-strong-
presumpition-of-patent-validity.html. (Apr. 15, 2009).
170 E.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 49 (2007) (proposing that the "clear and convincing
evidence" presumption be replaced with weaker "preponderance of the evidence"
standard).
171 35 U.S.C. § 282 (20o6).
172 Janis, supra note 168, at 930 ("[T]here is no strict, inevitable correlation between the
words of the evidentiary standard and the overlying message delivered by the presumption
of validity.").
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practice where patents are routinely issued by the PTO that do not
deserve monopoly power.173
3. CERTAINTY IN PATENT CLAIM INTERPRETATION
A further rationale in patent policy is the desire for certainty
surrounding the interpretation of patent claims. 174 However, the
rationale that certainty is paramount is deeply undercut when one
reflects on all of the uncertainty present in the system. 175 Consider that
interpretive rules are constantly in flux because infringement
litigation concerning invalidity does not carry over to other litigants
unless the patent is found invalid, and that the Federal Circuit
routinely overturns lower court decisions about claim construction. 176
Furthermore, a little more uncertainty in pharmaceutical patents will
not likely affect the market because there are many other sources of
uncertainty surrounding the pharmaceutical industry as a whole,
including FDA trials and huge liability due to side effects.77 More
uncertainty in pharmaceutical patents will not be especially significant
to the economic realities of the current pharmaceutical market.
4. THE INSURANCE DEFENSE TO REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Closely tied with the idea of certainty of patent rights is the
position that one should be able to "insure" against the loss of patent
rights. This position centers on the uncertainty in defending a patent
in litigation.7 8 Courts note that when the infringement plaintiffs are at
all uncertain as to the validity of their patents, they seek to, and have a
right to, "insure" the validity of their patents through settlement.79
'73See supra note 164.
174 Lichtman et al., supra note 170, at 56-57.
175 See id. at 57-59.
176 Id. at 57.
177 Id. at 58.
178 See Asahi Glass Co.,-289 F. Supp. 2d at 992-93 ("No one can be certain that he will
prevail in a patent suit.") (emphasis in original); Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 187.
179 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 210 (An infringement plaintiff may want to settle even when
they believe his or her patent is infringed "to insure against the possibility that its
confidence is misplaced, or, put another way, that a reviewing court might (in its view)
render an erroneous decision. Whatever the degree of the patent holder's certainty, there is
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When a license agreement is created, consideration on the part of
the licensor includes the prohibition from suing for infringement.18o
In return, the licensee receives assurance that it will not be sued for
patent infringement. 81 This, in effect, allows the licensor to create an
insurance policy for the validity of the patent by using the threat of an
infringement suit based on the presumptively valid patent as a
bargaining chip. The leverage of an infringement suit only carries
weight because the patent is presumed valid. Effectively, a bad patent
can undeservingly be allowed to use its presumptive validity as a
leveraging weight for insuring its validity. A patent that should be
powerless is presumed to have power, which allows it to maintain its
power. This should be a major concern.
Speaking unfavorably about insurance theories surrounding
patent licensing,182 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a licensee
is afforded an insurance policy against being sued for infringement as
consideration for the license agreement. 83 On many fronts, insuring
the validity of a patent through a reverse payment settlement is not
favored by patent law.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: PATENT MISUSE AS A FRAMEWORK
Reverse payment settlements can be viewed through a lens of
patent law and policy. Thus, any solution to the problem of suspicious
always some risk of loss that the patent holder might wish to insure against by settling.")
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1075 ("Due to the
'asymmetrics of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee confident in the validity of
its patent might pay a potential infringer a substantial sum in settlement."') (quoting
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1310).
180 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 134-35 (rejecting the argument that "[p]ermitting [licensee] to
challenge the validity of the patent without terminating or breaking the agreement alters
the deal, allowing the licensee to continue enjoying its immunity while bringing a suit, the
elimination of which was part of the patentee's quid pro quo.").
181 Id.
182 See id. ("When a licensee enters such an agreement, they contend, it essentially
purchases an insurance policy, immunizing it from suits for infringement so long as it
continues to pay royalties and does not challenge the covered patents. Permitting it to
challenge the validity of the patent without terminating or breaking the agreement alters
the deal, allowing the licensee to continue enjoying its immunity while bringing a suit, the
elimination of which was part of the patentee's quid pro quo ... [T]he point seems to us
mistaken.").
183 Id.
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reverse payment settlements ought to stem from the richly developed
doctrines of patent law. These doctrines, independent of antitrust law,
may be a stepping stone for solving this problem.
The most logical doctrine within patent law to substantively apply
to a reverse payment situation is patent misuse. This is because the
patent misuse doctrine is closely intertwined with the antitrust laws of
the United States. The specifics of misuse, as well as how a misuse
framework could be applied will be explored in the following sections.
A. BASICS OF THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE
A patent owner is guilty of misuse when the owner violates
antitrust laws or "extends" a patent's rights beyond its legal scope.184 If
misuse is found, courts hold the patent unenforceable until the misuse
has been purged.185 Misuse developed as a common law, equitable
doctrine that is used as an affirmative defense to a suit for patent
infringement. 186 A successful assertion of patent misuse requires the
infringer to show that the "physical or temporal scope" of the patent
has been broadened with an anticompetitive effect. 87 Traditionally,
patent misuse has been successfully employed in scenarios involving
product tying and other traditional areas of antitrust analysis. 188
However, substantial differences exist between the patent misuse
doctrine and the developed antitrust laws of the United States. Patent
misuse arose out of the doctrine of unclean hands long before
Congress enacted any form of antitrust legislation. 189 The Supreme
Court has relied not on the antitrust laws, but rather on the public
184 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2010).
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1l0 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
187 Id.
188 See CHISUM, supra note 184, § 19.0413] ("The three classic acts of misuse are (1)
requiring the purchase of unpatented good for use with patented apparatus or processes,
(2) prohibiting production or sale of competing goods, and (3) conditioning the granting of
a license under one patent upon the acceptance of another and different license.").
189 See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998); B. Braun Med.,
Inc. v. Abbott Lab., Inc., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Patent misuse arose, as an
equitable defense available to the accused infringer, from the desire 'to restrain practices
that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the
patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to public policy."').
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policy found in the ends and means of the patent laws of the United
States when ruling in misuse cases. 190 For example, misuse can be
applied in some situations where there is no antitrust violation. 19' At
the heart of the misuse doctrine is the Court's intent to disallow one to
abuse the policy considerations of the Patent Act.9 2 Through the
Court's inception and development of the misuse doctrine, patent
policy of benefit to the public interest has been the chief concern.193
Because patent policy is at the center of misuse, the patent policy
levers discussed in Part III become critical. If a misuse framework is
applied, these patent policy levers now become some of the deciding
factors in a case as opposed to antitrust doctrine as is currently
employed by the courts. Next, I explore the challenges of adapting
misuse to a reverse payment setting.
B. TAILORING MISUSE FOR THE REVERSE PAYMENT SITUATION
The misuse doctrine, as it exists today, is of little help in the
reverse payment context. While the substantive patent misuse
doctrine is very similar to antitrust analysis, the limitations on the
applicability of patent misuse in the context of reverse payment
settlements are glaring. Most notably, misuse is used to defend
against infringement, not to target misuse on behalf of societal
interests. Additionally, damages cannot be attained from an assertion
of patent misuse, as is the case in a claim of an antitrust violation.
Therefore, while antitrust can be thought of as a sword, misuse has
been used exclusively as a shield.194 In the context of reverse payment
settlements, the shield is a useless tool, as the infringer, who would
190 CHISUM, supra note 184, § 19.04[2].
191 Id.; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969)
("[I]f there was ... patent misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies
the ingredients of a violation of either § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman Act[.]").
192 See W.L. Gore & Assoc., 529 F.2d 614, 622 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[M]isuse may be a violation
of the public policy embodied in the patent law itself.").
193 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942) ("The grant to the
inventor of the special privilege of a patent monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, 'to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts[.]'. .. It is a principle of general application that courts, and especially courts of
equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is using the right asserted
contrary to the public interest.") (quoting U.S. CONST.).
194 NARD, supra note 10, at 619.
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hold the shield, is in on the deal. It is clear that the currently
developed procedural aspects of the doctrine of misuse would serve as
little help.
However, the ideas imbedded within the misuse doctrine of
serving the public interest are consistent with and could serve as a
basis in altering or forming a new class of misuse, which targets
reverse payment settlements. This would require substantial re-
working and expansion of the misuse doctrine as it exists today,
particularly in its procedural aspects. However, it is the doctrine's
intense interest and rooted history in patent policy that makes it a
starting point for potential exploration. To address the problem of
reverse payment settlements, this note proposes sufficiently
broadening patent misuse doctrine to make it capable of targeting
suspicious reverse payment settlements.
First, the misuse shield would need to become an antitrust-type
sword. A new misuse doctrine could take on many of the procedural
characteristics of an antitrust claim, where stakeholders
independently file suit on the colluding settlement makers.
Specifically, the misuse doctrine would have to be applied to settling
parties, rather than two parties who are in an infringement dispute.
This requires a procedural change. However, the important difference
between the antitrust allegations currently being employed and a
misuse procedure would be the standard applied: patent misuse policy
arguments rather than antitrust rule of reason analysis.
Second, the misuse doctrine would have to be expanded to deal
with the exact issues of reverse payment settlements. The standard of
patent misuse, broadening the scope of a patent with an
anticompetitive effect, is reasonably present is some reverse payment
settlements. For example, it could be argued that a weak patent is
likely being afforded broadened scope when it is used to quell a non-
infringing generic from entering the market. The patent is broadened
because it is being used as a bargaining chip when it may in fact be
worthless if no infringement is found. Additionally, the
anticompetitive nature of the agreement is clearly present. While this
would be a notable addition of the doctrine, it would not appear to be
an unachievable step since misuse has continued to develop for the
past century into a broad range of categorical cases. 195
195 See CHISUM, supra note 184, § 19.o413][a]-[1]. Acts of misuse include tying
arrangements, covenants not to deal in competing goods, package licensing, post-
expiration royalties and restraints, royalty based on total sales, refusal to license, excessive
or discriminatory royalties, price fixing, territorial limitations, resale restraints, field-of-
use and consumer limitations, grant-back clauses, restraints on the patentee, covenants
not to license, suppression, and compulsory licensing.
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C. SPECIFICS OF THE PROPOSED NEW PATENT MISUSE PROCEDURE
The misuse doctrine could be applied to a reverse payment
settlement under the following procedure. First, a government agency
such as the FDA, DOJ, FTC, or a private party, such as a class action
group or an organization such as AARP, could charge the settling
parties with a claim of misuse. Standing for these groups would be
appropriate within the patent policy framework of misuse since the
Court has explicitly stated that the public interest is critical as a policy
lever. 196
Next, a court would examine the reverse payment settlement and
identify whether the settlement is suspicious and presumptively
illegal. The standard for this judgment would be based on the models
discussed previously in Part II.B., such as those proposed by
Hovenkamp, Cotter, or Crane. This note does not seek to determine
the exact standard, as many academics have previously squared off in
that arena, 97 however, some standard of presumptive illegality would
be applied.
If the settlement was found to fall into the presumptively illegal
group, the patent would become unenforceable under misuse. The
burden of showing that the brand name pharmaceutical company's
patent was infringed would fall to the settling parties (misuse
defendants).198
At this point, the settling parties would have the opportunity to
prove that the patent was in fact infringed at a patent misuse hearing.
Again, the standard by which this would be judged is open for
argument. The "clear and convincing" standard currently used for
patent invalidity could be employed. However, since the presumption
of illegality has been previously made during the initial misuse
examination, the settling parties would then have to prove with clear
and convincing evidence that the patent was infringed, making the
196 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670-71. The standing requirements could take on a model such as used
for environmental law, where the government, along with watchdog groups like the Sierra
Club, routinely patrols for violations. However, standing is an issue that should be more
closely examined in future works.
197 See supra Part II.B.
198 The presumed unenforceability of the patent may seem like a harsh punishment on the
settlers, since the settlers have not yet been afforded the chance to prove that the patent is
valid and being infringed by the generic pharmaceutical company. However, the process
employed here would not be the issue. Rather, the standard employed for the initial
presumptive illegality would be the factor causing a harsh punishment to the settlers.
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settlement terms legitimate. Finally, if the settlers could clear this
obstacle, their settlement would again be held as legal and the patent
would return to an enforceable state.
The patent misuse hearing would function similarly to a patent
infringement trial. All of the doctrines of patent law would apply,
including construing the claims and deciding on infringement, as well
as any infringement defenses that may be relevant. All of the
infringement defenses would apply. Therefore, arguments could be
made that the patent is invalid, or that the patent is valid but not
being infringed. Examples include invalidating the patent based on a
finding of prior art, a violation of a statutory bar, or patent attorney
misconduct. As in traditional infringement litigation, the settlers
would bear the burden of presenting evidence of patent infringement.
Additional prior art or other key information such as proof of early
sales would be presented by the charging party.
In summary, the charging party would take on a similar role to a
traditional infringement defendant, while the settling parties would
take on the role of the patent holder asserting an infringement claim.
The methods of patent infringement litigation do not need to be
altered to any significant degree.
To make the suggested procedure more clear, consider an
example. Assume a reverse payment settlement has been made
between GloboCorp, a drug patent holder and name-brand
pharmaceutical company, and GenericDrugs, Inc., a generic drug
company. The payment made to GenericDrugs, Inc. was in excess of
the costs of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit
(Hovenkamp's proposed threshold for presumptive illegality). 199 At
this point, a party such as the FTC could file a suit claiming violation
of patent misuse. If the court used the Hovenkamp threshold, the
patent would be presumed unenforceable upon the filing of a patent
misuse suit.
Soon after, GloboCorp would be entitled to a patent misuse
hearing. The hearing would function similarly to a patent
infringement lawsuit. GloboCorp would seek to prove that the patent
would have been infringed by GenericDrugs, Inc. when the settlement
was made. The FIC would seek to prove that the patent was not being
infringed. To do this, the FTC could bring new prior art to the table or
assert other infringement defenses. To aid in gathering these
resources, the FTC could be assisted by any interested group, such as
AARP or other public interest lobbies.
199 See supra Part Il.B.
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If the settling parties failed to prove infringement, the patent
would be found to be misused, and would thus be unenforceable. If
the patent was not invalidated completely at the patent misuse
hearing, the patent's power could be revived if the reverse payment
settlement was effectively undone, which may include paying back the
money given to the generic in the settlement. If the patent was found
to be valid but there was not infringement, GloboCorp would still
suffer an injury because other generics can then move in and begin to
make the drug.
GenericDrug, Inc. would be in an interesting situation, likely
wanting to keep its reverse payment settlement, so it could side with
GloboCorp to show the patent was infringed and the settlement was
legitimate. However, if GenericDrug, Inc. finds itself in a better
situation by the patent being found to be misused, it could side with
the FTC. This may be ideal for the public, as GenericDrug, Inc. may
have inside information which would benefit the FTC during the
patent misuse hearing. Either way, GenericDrug, Inc. is not really
benefiting from its collusion with GloboCorp because if the patent is
found to not have been infringed, its money must be returned and
other generics will have the ability to compete in the market, thus
driving down GenericDrug, Inc.'s profits. Additionally, the period of
exclusivity that GenericDrug, Inc. could have had will likely be gone.
With the monopoly busted, consumers would have a generic
alternative that costs substantially less than GloboCorp's costly drug.
GloboCorp can no longer hold its monopoly, which is equitable, since
GenericDrug, Inc. was never infringing GloboCorp's patent.
D. ADVANTAGES IN UTILIZING THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE
Advantages such as adherence to stare decisis, less confusion
between antitrust and patent law, and equitable damages for the guilty
patent owner would become apparent when adopting a misuse
standard. First, a misuse-type test would allow a court to continue to
hold that these agreements are not in violation of the antitrust laws,
but are instead in violation of patent misuse. This would not conflict
with the court's current treatment of the issue.200 Stare decisis could
be maintained.201
Second, the problem of a patent infringement trial within an
antitrust trial would be somewhat subverted since no antitrust
20o See supra Part I.D.
20 See id.
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analysis is taking place. The patent misuse hearing would actually go
on within a patent court. There would be no back and forth between
antitrust law and patent law. This is more desirable because the laws
of patent and antitrust will not be confused or intertwined. While a
court examining a settlement under a misuse standard could rely on
developed antitrust policy, its primary concern would be patent law
and so it would seem perfectly appropriate to examine the scope of the
claims and the validity of that patent within that examination.
Finally, the penalty of unenforceability would not be too extreme,
as the patent's rights could be revived when the misuse stops. This is a
benefit for the brand name drug maker because there is no risk that
antitrust treble damages will have to be paid.
E. PROPELLING CHANGE IN PATENT MISUSE
A wide range of substantive and procedural changes in misuse
would need to take place, but what can propel such a change? The first
route to consider would be a completely court-developed misuse
doctrine to apply to reverse payment settlements. With the rather
flexible approach adopted by many courts in the development of the
misuse doctrine, it would not be an unimaginable stretch to mold a
new, misuse-rooted test to challenge the validity of suspicious reverse
payment settlements. Admittedly though, this sort of step would be a
substantial one, and it can only be speculated if an activist court would
be prepared to make such a step.
A second option is to provide the court with a stimulus. Such a
stimulus could come from new legislation which calls for such a
change in the misuse doctrine to be developed. One such possibility
would be an amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act. Such an
amendment could demand that a court be open to a misuse-type
proceeding described above to analyze the fairness of a reverse
payment settlement. This would allow a patent court to analyze the
patent, completely unrelated to any antitrust claim. The legislation
approach is probably more realistic, and could even be embedded
within the Hatch-Waxman Act.20 2
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the doctrine of patent misuse could be a potential
tool in targeting reverse payment settlements. Patent policy is in favor
20221 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
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of limiting suspicious reverse payment settlements and a misuse
analysis would take that patent policy into account when determining
the legality of a reverse payment settlement. While substantial
procedural and substantive changes in patent misuse would be
required, its close ties to antitrust analysis and its concern with
defending the public good make it a feasible alternative to the
antitrust rule of reason analysis of reverse payment settlements.
